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ABSTRACT 
This paper is based upon a discussion of the rise and fall of the iron ore mining industry in 
the Labrador trough of the Québec-Labrador région. The growth of exploration, development, 
expansion and décline phases are noted overthe period between 1950 (circa) to 1984. Référence 
is made to the single industry nature of the industrialization process in the région and to the 
absence of long-term industrial growth. 
KEW WORDS: Iron mining région, Québec-Labrador, Industrial frontier, dependency, external 
ownership. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Naissance et déclin du «quatrième empire du Saint-Laurent»: 
la région minière du Québec-Labrador 
Le présent article porte sur la naissance et le déclin de l'industrie de l'extraction du minerai 
de fer de la fosse du Labrador. La croissance de l'exploration minière, le développement de la 
région, l'expansion de l'industrie et finalement son déclin sont considérés pour la période 
s'étendant des environs de 1950 jusqu'à 1984. Plus particulièrement, il sera question d'un cas de 
développement économique régional basé sur une industrie unique et de l'absence de croissance 
industrielle à long terme. 
MOTS-CLÉS : Région d'extraction du minerai de fer, le Québec-Labrador, frontière industrielle, 
dépendance, contrôle étranger. 
When in the early 1950's it became clear that iron ore sites in the Québec-
Labrador trough were to be mined, there were great expectations for a new « industrial 
millenium» in a new frontier région.1 Through a period of some 80 years prior to that 
event there was a tacit récognition of the existence and importance of iron ore 
deposits in Québec. However, it was not until after World War II that a combination of 
American demand and Canadian capital drew the région into the continental North 
American economy. This paper présents a background to this pénétration process 
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and argues that such a development programme could only lead to l imited industrial 
growth and the peripheral ization of the région (Bradbury and St. Martin, 1983 ; Dugas, 
1983). While it was apparent that a number of jobs were created in conjunct ion with a 
séries of mining sett lements there was, however, little opportuni ty for extended and 
deeper industrial growth drawing upon the resources of the région. Instead the 
process involved export based resource extractive industries on a narrow mining base 
of single enterprise communi t ies. Indeed it became clear in the 1960's and 1970's that 
the intention of the steel companies, who owned the mines, was to draw upon the 
resource base of the région and not to expand its industrial base (Bradbury and Wolfe, 
1981 and 1983; Wojciechowski, 1984). 
THE INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT OF THE QUÉBEC-LABRADOR 
MINING SYSTEM 
The post World War II era saw the Québec-Labrador iron ore industry in Canada 
drawn doser into the orbit of American influence. The United States was reputed to 
hâve depleted its raw materials resource base, especially iron ore, and in a period 
gr ipped by the cold war it sought to gain access to external supplies, including iron 
ore from Québec. Japanese f i rms as well as those United States mult inationals which 
did not expand into Québec, moved into Austral ia and the Third World, including 
Africa and Latin America. (Bradbury, 1984a and 1984b; Bradbury and St. Martin, 
1983). 
Canada as a whole possesses immense reserves of direct shipping ore as well as 
reserves of low to médium grade ore that can be processed to upgrade the iron 
content. However in the 1890's, in the first phase of national industrial ization, both 
central Canadian steel f i rms as well as steel mills around Chicago, Pittsburgh and 
Cleveland turned to major and more accessible ore deposits in the Mesabi Range in 
Minnesota in the United States. Thèse deposits south and west of Lake Superior were 
easier to mine and, as a conséquence, direct interest in Canada's iron ore was not 
evinced by both Canadian and American companies, until the early 1950's. 
In contrast to the United States which has major iron deposits concentrated in the 
Great Lakes areas, Canadian deposits are quite diverse. There are large and small 
mines associated with deposits ail the way across the Canadian Shield from Manitoba 
to the east coast of Labrador. (Downie, 1970). A deposit known as the Steep Rock 
area, which is similar in structure and type to the Mesabi Range deposits in Minnesota, 
occurs in northwestern Ontario, 150 miles west of Port Arthur. A second and larger 
deposit occurs in the Québec-Labrador t rough which runs north from central Québec 
along the provincial border line to Ungava Bay and further north to Hudson Strait. A 
third deposit, now largely worked out and abandoned, is located on Bell Island off the 
southwest coast of Newfoundland. Other smaller deposits are located in northern 
Ontario, southwest Québec and British Columbia. 
The Québec-Labrador t rough région has produced approximately 75% to 90% of 
national product ion of iron ore, most of which is exported to the United States, Europe 
or Japan. Iron ore deposits in Northern Ontario are mostly comparatively minor ; 
mines located there supply steel mills in Ontario and United States. The major 
signif icant change which has occured in the last one hundred years in the régional 
d istr ibut ion of product ion has been the fall of Atlantic Canada, especially of the iron 
mines in Newfoundland, and the décl ine of the steel industry in Nova Scotia. The 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE « FOURTH EMPIRE OF THE ST. LAWRENCE» 353 
industrial production of steel moved instead to the heartland of southern Ontario, onto 
the golden horseshoe région around Hamilton and Toronto. Ontario presently has by 
far the major Canadian crude steel capacity (80,1%), followed by Québec (7,69%), and 
Nova Scotia (5,4%). Régional employment in the steel industry mirrors this pattern of 
production concentration (Bradbury, 1982a, 1982b and 1982c; Frank, 1977). 
Probably the most notable feature of the régional concentration of iron ore 
production and steel making in Canada is the absence of major corporate linkages 
and supply relationships between the iron ore région in Québec-Labrador, which 
produces the bulk of Canada's indigenous iron ore, and the major steel making région 
in southern Ontario. This split is long standing and is unlikely to be resolved unless 
major restructuring of capital occurs and major upheavals in the corporate ownership 
patterns of the entire industry take place. In northeastern Canada there are however, 
major linkages between United States based firms and mining opérations especially in 
the Québec-Labrador trough. Most recently the iron mines of Québec-Labrador hâve 
experienced a severe restructuring phase involving closures, layoffs and relocations 
(Bradbury and St. Martin, 1983; SBJ, 1983; Québec, 1983; Rigaud and Dugay, 1983). 
PENETRATION AND DEPENDENCY RELATIONS 
The United States based steel firms originally moved into Québec and Labrador in 
the late 1940's and early 1950's in an attempt to secure long term supplies of iron ore. 
While they succeeded in building a corporate linkage between an iron ore région and 
a steel making area, the status of extrême dependency in such relationships is very 
évident. Major plants, firms and town sites are mostly dépendent upon United States 
firms which in turn are responsive to the cyclical and compétitive behaviour of the 
global steel industry. Within Québec there is évidence that the State (provincial 
government) has attempted to alleviate some of this external dependence. It has 
endeavoured to rationalize the iron ore and steel industry in the région, by purchasing 
several iron ore mines as well as processing plants in the Québec-Labrador trough; 
and by consolidating steel making and manufacturing plants in Montréal under the 
auspices of a State corporation, SIDBEC (Bradbury, 1982a). However, in 1984 the 
State corporation involved with ore production and steel making (SIDBEC-NORMINE) 
in Québec closed down its mining opérations and the town site of Gagnon in Québec. 
Several opérations in the région experienced major difficulties in the 1980's 
resulting in closures, unemployment, émigration and loss of physical and social 
capital. Thèse local and régional patterns are a direct resuit of fluctuations in the steel 
business cycle, to which primary resource régions are peculiarly sensitive, and to the 
staccato progress of capital accumulation in the United States. In order to survive 
compétition and to continue the process of capital accumulation, even at a reduced 
rate of profit, certain plants and towns (e.g. Schefferville) were closed down or slowed 
down in order to ensure the survival of the multinational firm. This pattern is common 
to most resource based régions which are dépendent upon a single resource or on 
limited levels of processing, the products of which are placed on a very compétitive 
market (Bradbury, 1979; Bradbury and St. Martin, 1983). 
Nearly 70% of the ore mined in Québec-Labrador is shipped directly to parent 
companies in the United States; the balance is sold on contract in Western Europe 
and Japan. Dependence on the United States steel industry is clear, since ap-
proximately 85% of ail share stocks are held inside the United States (table 1). 
Table 1 
Iron Ore Mines in Canada 1983-1984 
Approx. % o > 
Opening Canada i 
Settlement Company Province Year Port Total Destination m 
13 
Schefferv i l le* IOCC Québec 1954 Sept-î les 14.6 USA, Europe, 
Japan 
5
 D
EGÉ 
Labrador City IOCC Newfoundland 1962 Sept-l les 23.8 Canada, USA, 
O
G
RAPHIE 
Japan, Europe 
O
G
RAPHIE 
Wabush Wabush Mines Newfoundland 1965 Pointe-Noire 10.4 USA, Europe 
O
G
RAPHIE Gagnon * Québec-Cart ier Québec 1965 Port-Cartier 16.9 USA, UK, 
O
G
RAPHIE 
Co Europe DUQ Fermont Sidbec Normines Québec 1974 Port-Cart ier 11.5 Canada, USA, 
D
UQ 
UK, Europe 3H
 
Shawvil le Hil ton Mines Québec 1958 
— 
1.9 USA, Canada 03 
m 
Marmora* Marmoranton Ontar io 1955 Picton 0.9 USA O 
Capreol National Steel Ontar io 1959 Depot Harbour 1.2 USA 
Vol 
Sherman Mines Timagami Ontar io 1968 
— 1.7 Canada ro 
Kirkland Lake Adams Mine Co Ontar io 1964 
— 
2.2 Canada 3 
Wawa Algoma Ore Co Ontar io 1939 Michip icoten 2.9 Canada, USA O 
At ikokan * Caiand Ore Ontar io 1960 Thunder Bay 3.8 USA 00 
Steep Rock Lake* Steep Rock Iron Ontar io 1944 Thunder Bay 2.6 Canada, USA CD-
o 
Bruce Lake Griff i th Mine Ontar io 1968 
— 
2.8 Canada CD 3 
Texada * Texada Mines Brit ish Columbia 1956 Texada Island 0.9 Japan cr CD 
Tasu * Wesfrob Mines Brit ish Columbia 1967 Tasu 1.9 Japan, USA co 
Sudbury * National Steel Ontar io nd nd nd nd 00 en 
* Closed. 
Sources: L. Beauregard (1973), La géographie du fer au Canada. Une mutation en cours, Cahiers de Géographie de Québec, 17 (40), 
Canadian Minerais Yearbook(s), Bradbury and Wolfe (1983) ; Financial Post Corporation Service Files (various years). 
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Corporate control, except for one Québec owned state corporation, is therefore 
located outside the région. Control over the mining activity as well as over the mining 
space was obtained through long term mining rights and leases granted by the 
governments of Québec and Newfoundiand between 1950 and 1980. Thèse rights 
enabled a monopoly over space and over the stages of économie development and 
levels of processing within the région as a whole. Such a status permitted foreign 
owned companies to maintain only a minimum level of processing with little incentive 
on the part of the state to pressure or encourage them to alter it. Monopoly rights to 
space hâve also meant that it was difficult for other mining companies, or even other 
industrial activities such as lumber or wood harvesting, to become part of the 
industrial profile of the région. 
THE QUÉBEC-LABRADOR IRON ORE REGION: INDUSTRIAL FRONTIER 
AND THE ROOTS OF REGIONAL DEPENDENCY 
The iron ore era began in 1870 when Fr. Louis Babel, O.M.I., reporting on a 
mission through northern Québec, noted that abundant deposits of iron ore were 
apparent near Knob Lake adjacent to the présent day town site of Schefferville. Again 
the ore was « rediscovered» between 1892 and 1895 when geologist A.P. Low, 
attached to the Canadian Geological Survey, noted the vast deposits near Knob Lake. 
It is also notable that almost at that same time detailed surveys were being made of iron 
ore deposits in Michigan and Wisconsin ; and in 1890 the vast resources of the Mesabi 
Range in Minnesota were definitively established. 
Before World War II there were few attempts to further reconnoitre the iron ore 
reserves of the Ungava peninsula, Québec-Labrador, where the bulk of the ore lay. 
The war, however, had a positive effect on the stimulation of further survey work, 
especially as both Canadian and American steel makers were made aware of the 
industrially stratégie nature of both iron ore and steel. Indeed the war period itself saw 
intensive searches for suitable ore bodies in the United States, Ontario, and the 
Ungava peninsula. 
In 1942, the Hollinger North Shore Company Ltd., a wholly owned Canadian 
subsidiary of Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd., was incorporated in Québec to 
follow up, explore, and establish rights over the région of Nouveau-Québec where the 
iron ore, noted by A.P. Low, was located. In 1942 the company acquired prospecting 
and minerai exploration rights over approximately 3900 square miles of land in 
Nouveau-Québec (Ungava territory) in the région of Attikamagen-Wokuach Lakes 
lying to the north and west of the boundary territory of Labrador (Québec, 1944). On 
the Labrador side of the border and to the east of the Hollinger license area the 
Newfoundiand government had, in 1938, granted a spécial license, covering some 
20000 square miles in the western part of the Hamilton river basin adjacent to 
Schefferville and including the same ore deposits. Major developments took place 
first, however, on the Québec side of the boundary near Knob Lake and Burnt Creek 
(Québec, 1946). In 1946 the Québec government granted a spécial minerai exploration 
license and a long term lease on an area of 3900 square miles to the Hollinger North 
Shore Exploration Company which was an updated version of their previous tenure, 
granted largely to define firmer rights and to establish the basis of cost structuring and 
royalties. 
Between 1942 and 1944 the Hollinger North Shore Exploration Company mapped 
the iron ore deposits of new Québec and prospected the depth, quality, type and value 
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Figure 1 
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of the ores. The basis of the Corporate Structure eventuating in control by the Iron 
Ore Company of Canada (IOCC) became obvious at this stage. While, as we hâve 
noted, little attention was paid to geologist Low'searlier reports, the mid-1930's sawa 
rapid increase in new geological reports, which led a Montréal mining group to 
acquire minerai concessions of over 20000 square miles from the Newfoundland 
government. This was the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company whose rights 
extended up to the border with Québec. Quickly concessions were sought on the 
Québec side as well. And in 1942 control of the whole région was acquired by Hollinger 
Consolidated Mines Ltd. which included a 40% equity interest held by M.A. Hanna 
Company of Cleveland, Ohio. Their marriage produced the offspring Hollinger North 
Shore Exploration Company whose purpose was to gain control of Québec's iron ore 
reserves. Coopération between this Canadian-American linkage and the Duplessis 
government of Québec eventuated in full control being exercised over iron ore 
developments in the région {Financial Post, 1967). 
The programme of exploration in 1947 was heralded by the drive to find new 
global sources of iron ore. American firms were still urgently looking for reserves and 
Canadian companies were eager to oblige. Indeed it was not until 1947 that drilling 
began seriously ; previously the iron ore attracted little interest as the main objective 
of the search was base metals of différent types — the discovery of iron ore was thus 
regarded as a fortuitous side-issue. 
Drilling in 1947 which indicated the présence of at least 150 000 000 tons of iron 
ore, established the site as a prime case for north American exploitation, provided of 
course the capital was available and the political will présent. A permanent présence 
in the form of an air-base was established near the présent site of Schefferville. Local 
roads were constructed and preliminary surveying of a railway route to the sea in the 
south was completed. To accommodate this development process two subsidiary 
companies, Québec North Shore and Labrador Railway Company, and the Ungava 
Power Company were incorporated. For the most part exploration in thèse early 
stages was established in licenced areas to the north of the présent day mining 
régions near the town sites of Schefferville, Labrador City, Fermont and Wabush. 
Thèse latter sites were established in southerly zones of ore doser to sea transpor-
tation in areas uninterrupted by multiple-license daims, which was the case in the 
more northerly deposits. 
In 1949 Knob Lake became established as the «urban» focal centre of mining 
opérations. In that year a government airbase was laid out, new warehouses were built 
and a staff house, construction site and company guest house established. A new 
company, the Hollinger-Ungava Transport Company Ltd., transported equipment into 
the area and the Ungava Power Company submitted a pétition to the provincial 
government of Québec to harness the Eaton Canyon rapids on the Caniapiscau river 
to supply 140 000 horsepower of electricity to the mines and the town site. 
In that same year of 1949 the roots of dependency, growing from the seed of 
American steelmakers, sprouted a new company to exploit the iron ore reserves of the 
Québec-Labrador région. This was the Iron Ore Company of Canada, incorporated in 
Delaware in the United States on November 18, 1949 by a core of steelmakers : Armco 
Steel Corporation, Hanna Coal and Ore Corporation, National Steel Corporation and 
the Youngstown Sheet and Tool Company. Ail of thèse United States firms entered 
into a senior partnership with the Hollinger North Shore Exploration Company and 
Labrador Mining and Exploration Company. The organisation and opérations of the 
Iron Ore Company of Canada at this stage were under the control of a Canadian based 
company incorporated in late 1949 as the Hollinger-Hanna Company (Québec, 1949). 
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The pattern created by the ownership and control of the Iron Ore Company of 
Canada in 1949 largely dictated the industrial development process and resource 
exploitation orientation which followed in the next three décades. Working with 
United States backers and finances, J.R. Timmins, the président of Hollinger Consoli-
dated Gold Mines, a Canadian company, laid the template of resource dependency. 
The operating vehicle conceived was the Iron Ore Company of Canada (IOCC). It was 
capitalised initially at$ 170 million (1949 Can.$) — $30 million of common stock, $40 
million of 3% income bonds, $ 100 million of prior lien bonds. Thefinancial participants 
received $3 million of common stock for their initial $5 million of committment. 
Hollinger North Shore received $3 million of common stock and Labrador Mining and 
Exploration $2 million, plus a 7% royalty on the value of iron ore exported. The 
Hollinger and Hanna Companies each subscribed in cash for $2,5 million and the 
steel companies including Hanna Mining subscribed some $20 million (Park and Park, 
1973). 
While détails on the actual funding and financing détails of IOCC in its initial 
years are difficult to obtain, a report of the events, published in 1973 suggested that 
85% of the funds required were raised by borrowing on the crédit of IOCC bonds and 
debentures while the remainder came from share issues. On the basis of an analysis of 
1957-1959 data it was judged that $40 million of investments came from debentures 
and loans mostly within Canada {ibid.). The management of the IOCC was initially 
supervised by a Canadian company equally owned by Hollinger and Hanna for a fee of 
10 cents per ton of ail ore and specialties sold. Share ownership by the United States 
based steel partners obliged them to pay for some facilities to unnamed limits and to 
accept a proportional limit of the iron ore produced by the IOCC each year in their 
Québec-Labrador mines {Financial Post, 1949). 
REGIONAL «BOOSTERISM» AND EXPORT-BASED DEVELOPMENT 
Between 1949 and 1954 when the first iron ore left the région for United States 
steel furnaces, a new town was constructed at Schefferville near Knob Lake, hydro 
power stations were completed at Menihek and Sainte-Marguerite; the railway line to 
the southern part of Sept-lles was completed and a workforce engaged to work in the 
mines. The proven ore reserves were estimated at the time to be 417707000 tons 
(revised from 1947 estimâtes). It was in this early 1950's period too that more southerly 
reserves were discovered in the great belt of iron ore running in a north south 
direction following the inclination of the Québec-Labrador trough. The final estimâtes 
of the reserves indicated % were in Québec and 1/3 in Labrador — mostly of lower 
grade and between 35% and 50% iron content. By comparing the Nouveau-Québec 
deposits to those of the Mesabi Range in the United States it is possible to obtain a 
more précise idea of their relative sizes: the Mesabi Range iron ore zones cover an 
area of approximately 110 miles in length by one to five miles in width, including a most 
favoured zone of 70 miles length. In comparison the Nouveau-Québec deposits, 
known in 1951, covered an area of 225 miles long by 10 to 60 miles wide with a most 
favoured zone some 90 miles in length (Québec, 1951). 
Development works in the région up until 1954 were concentrated on establishing 
the infrastructure of a vast mining venture in the Québec/Labrador trough. The 1950's 
and 1960's henceforth were a period of great excitement and anticipation as the mines 
and railways exemplified the pénétration and taming of a new territory. It was 
industrial frontiersmanship at its best. There was a certain air of romance and 
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excitement as yet another mining frontier was opened within the parameters of a huge 
mega-project. The mines and the région itself became the mecca of nationalist 
politicians and the repository of fashionably oriented sentimentalism for «the north» 
and for resource based industrial growth. It was this latter point which became 
somewhat of a misnomer as the great bulk of the ore was destined for United States 
steel makers deflating the potential of northern steel mills and steel towns providing 
jobs and pouring steel for the Québec economy. Indeed it was not until 1977, some 
twenty two years after the first shipments of ore left the Québec-Labrador région, that 
any «Québec-ore» was turned into «Québec-steel». 
In Québec, the State played an important rôle in the development of the iron ore 
industry both before and after the 1954 starting date at Schefferville. Législation 
permitting and encouraging the mining companies to invest in and explore the minerai 
base of the province, and later to build towns, mines and railways, came from 
successive provincial governments. The intent of each government was to promote 
resource exploitation with a view to facilitating indigenous employment and indus-
trialization. Unfortunately the nature of the industrial programmes involved did not 
extend the levels of industrialization within the région — largely because the mining 
industry itself was designed to produce inputs into United States steelmakers, who 
were, needless to say, not located in the Québec-Labrador area. Thus the romance of 
the frontier became exchanged for the subservience and dependency of a resource-
supply area limited in its capacity to produce both added-value and surplus value ; and 
limited in its ability to savour the fruits of «boom» periods and to survive the 
downswing and «bust» periods. 
Successive provincial governments in both Québec and Labrador utilized royalty 
structures and concession Systems to finance opération and to «regulate» the 
opération of the mining companies. In principle the concession System recognised 
corporate control over bounded land areas in exchange for limited royalties. The 
concession System, by reserving areas from public staking, in accordance with the 
gênerai provision of the Crown Lands (Mines and Quarries) Act, and by entering into 
«private» or «spécial» arrangements with favoured companies, was the major method 
of disposing of minerai rights on Crown Funds. In London in 1938 the first major 
concession in the mining industry was granted to the Labrador Mining and Exploration 
Company. The first agreement, based on royalties, was for a period of eight years. 
Initially too, as with the Québec mining agreements, mechanisms were developed 
whereby land could be returned to crown control if insufficient investments were 
made in development, or if opérations were abandoned. Under thèse arrangements in 
1974, the Iron Ore Company of Canada paid 5% of its profits to the Newfoundland 
Government as Royalty, or approximately 40 cents per ton of iron ore shipped by the 
company (Newfoundland, 1974). 
Apart from royalties, urban controls through municipal bodies, and some controls 
of taxation and boundary limits, the governments of Québec and Newfoundland had 
little access to the décision making faculties of the mining companies in the iron ore 
région. It seemed that in a short period of three to four years, rights to access to iron 
ore were alienated to large mining companies linked through financial and corporate 
networks to externally based steel companies. 
The manner in which control and ownership of the iron ore resource was 
alienated exemplifies the pénétration and resource extraction programmes exacted by 
large multinational resource companies in their search for multiple sources of 
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minerais and their search for captive and linked supply régions. The story in Québec-
Labrador began with the activities of one Jules Timmins of Hollinger Consolidated 
who was largely responsible for the big exploration drive in Québec beginning in 1947 
(Financial Post, 1967). And Timmins was the man who drove the last spike symbolizing 
the completion of the railway from the sea-to-the mine in 1954. Timmins along with 
J.Y. Murdoch became minority shareholders in the Iron Ore Company of Canada 
which became the biggest developer in the Québec-Labrador région. 
Canada in the early 1950's and through to the mid 1960's became the new « Mecca 
for the big iron ore rush». There were numerous examples of external ownership 
relationships similar to those in Québec-Labrador. In 1951 for instance the Steel 
Company of Canada (Stelco), along with four United States steel companies, made 
inroads towards obtaining control of the Steep Rock Mines in Ontario. In Montréal in 
that same year too, the United States government announced a proposai for a $250 
million steel mill in New England to « make use of » Canadian iron ore (Financial Post, 
1951 ). In 1957 again the mining world awoke to talk of a « negotiations-behind-closed-
doors» to bring into production a « Wabush (Labrador) Iron Ore bonanza by Canadian 
and United States companies». The major deal hère was to obtain access to minerai 
rights and concessions held by a Canadian millionaire under the aegis of Canadian 
Javelin Ltd. (Financial Post, 1957). Under an agreement the Canadian company was 
purchased by seven big United States and Canadian steel companies including 
Pickands Matherand Stelco. 
The Wabush Mines group, located in Labrador and derived from the Canadian 
Javelin Company, is a further instance of the externalization of resource and 
dependency development in this period. The initial land deals to alienate the Wabush 
ore bodies commenced in 1952 when J.C. Doyle an Irish-American based in New 
York, paid $2500 to Newfoundland premier Smallwood, on 24000 square miles of 
Labrador territory. Doyle then sold the ore body rights, estimated at 1,5 billion tons, to 
ten major international steel companies. Canadian Javelin's rights were later modified 
to a subconcession of 2 300 square miles in the Wabush Lake area of Labrador, 
immediately south and adjacent to the Labrador concession of the Iron Ore Company 
of Canada near Schefferville. Exploration was carried out in 1953 and 1954 revealing 
an extensive body of ore averaging 67% to 68% iron. During 1955 the Newfoundland 
législative enacted «the Wabush Lake Railway Act, 1955» enabling Doyle's company 
to construct and operate a branch railway line to connect with the Iron Ore Company 
of Canada's railway linked to the port of Sept-lles. The Wabush railways shares were 
guaranteed unconditionally by the government of the province of Newfoundland 
(Financial Post, 1956). 
Doyle had originally obtained access rights from the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Corporation (NALCO), a crown agency set up by the Newfoundland government to 
dispose of minerai leases. The initial expenditure involved some $ 250 million over the 
first three years and later Doyle was able to purchase control of NALCO itself for 
$2 million. In the first six years of Doyle's opérations no Canadian companies were 
disposed to enter the iron ore race in Labrador. Instead the United States Steel 
Company, which was running out of ore at home entered the picture; eventually 
Canadian Javelin disappeared from the picture too, its function completed by the sale 
to U.S. Steel. Later Doyle was to disappear from the financial scène himself, shrouded 
in mysterious taxation and fiscal problems (MacLean's Magazine, 1962). 
The 1950's also saw a number of other deals between Canadian provinces, 
Canadian intermediaries, and United States interests, especially those linked with 
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steel and iron ore, and more especially with financing the St. Lawrence Seaway. The 
whole resource development picture in this period was in fact partially inspired by the 
United States Paley Report, the potential offered by a St. Lawrence Seaway network, 
and by the Canadian Government itself which actively facilitated pénétration by 
multinational companies and international capital. 
According to the Paley Report, published in 1952, by 1975 the United States 
would need to import some 65 million tons of foreign iron ore every year. In 1955 this 
amount was ten times the entire production in Canada. In anticipation of this bonanza, 
therefore, in 1955 alone some twenty companies were engaged in a nation-wide 
search for iron ore. Many of thèse activities of course never eventuated in a mining 
opération or a steel mill. Their purposes, however, did show quite dramatically the 
great international interest generated in the low grade ores of Québec-Labrador — an 
interest équivalent, incidentally, to the later moves by many of the same firms to 
higher grade ore body sites in the developing world, including Brazil and parts of 
sourthern Africa. 
The Canadian proposais included those of numerous steel companies in the 
United States, the Cyrus Eaton empire, the Krupp Empire in Germany and Japanese, 
French and British steel firms ail engaged in a frantic scramble for iron ore (Financial 
Post, 1956; Industrial Canada, 1951). The Cyrus Eaton — Krupp proposais were 
especially interesting because although they entailed detailed financial and industrial 
plans, they, like many others at the time, never came to fruition. Their significance, 
however, lay in the fact that they embraced international finances as well as German 
and American interests to be focussed on a small northern Québec community at 
Hopes Advance Bay {Financial Post, 1957 and 1959). Expectations of massive social 
change and upheaval, but most important of ail, employaient for local people were 
built up but never satisfied. The company's stratégies also followed a similar path to 
other development promoters. Cyrus Eaton (United States) interests, under the name 
of the Atlantic Iron Ore Company, made application for an operating license on the 
huge lowgrade ore deposit at Hopes Advance Bay. Under the license opérations were 
to commence in 1962. The combination of corporate interests would hâve meant 
production of 350 000 tons of iron ore pellets in 1963 rising to 5 million tons annually. 
When full production had been reached, a community for 4000 to 5 000 people was to 
be built at Hopes Advance Bay. A $ 10 million railway would connect the mine to the 
sea front and from there a bulk carrier «super tanker» would carry the iron ore to a 
transit port in Greenland. The plans were elaborate, grandiose and finally disappointing 
— especially for a number of potential employées in northern Québec ; but such was 
the stuff of planning and spéculative frontiersmanship of mega-projects in the 1950's 
{Financial Post, 1954 and 1959). 
Grandiose plans also marked the assessment of the potential of the whole north 
shore of the St. Lawrence région. However, the planning lacked the foresight and 
control which would hâve taken projects beyond the types of limited development 
which occured in the 1950's and 1960's. The régions' industrial future unfortunately 
never extended beyond the limited horizon of basic resource processing and exporting, 
with the roots of dependency clearly embedded in this limited status. Indeed 
throughout the post 1950 period, and even while the mining industry boomed in the 
1960's and 1970's, there was never any real attempt to promote additional industrial 
development, despite the présence of resources, energy, labour and finances. A litany 
of development ideas which followed the boom and bust cycles of the early 1980's, 
and the closures of mines and towns, had their précèdent set down in the later 1940's 
and early 1950's even before iron mining opérations commenced. This pattern, clearly 
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exposed by Parliamentary committee hearings in Scheffervil le in 1983, showed the 
industrial base of the région had not proceeded beyond a basic processing stage. But 
this also was the stuff that shattered dreams-in-the-wi lderness are made of (Québec, 
1983). 
The original plans, forecasts and projections in 1949 had demonstrated the great 
period of excitement and anticipation in the «new Empire of the St. Lawrence». 
Questions arose such as: does this mark the beginning of a vast new industrial 
expansion for Québec? Will a new industrial area for Canada arise out of the 
wilderness of Quebec's north shore in the wake of the iron development (Financial 
Post, 1949). In addit ion to thèse highly publicized questions, and some actual 
évidence of mining deployed by the Hanna-Hol l inger and J.R. Timmins connect ions, 
there were announcements of new designs to harness the wilderness, not unlike those 
voiced in British Columbia in the 1950's. Baie-Comeau's Bishop Labrie, speaking in 
1949, foresaw how the Land-God-Gave-to-Cain could be transformed from its rather 
poverty stricken state into a haven of happy prosperous homes fo râ t least 100 000 new 
French Canadian settlers. To support this whole. myth of grand-scale imagery, 
moneyed buccaneers f rom New England, Toronto and Montréal swaggered about the 
f inancial stage pronouncing the eminent coming of the industrial mi l lennium for la 
Côte-Nord. 
It was, for instance, not thought likely that ore would be shipped merely in crude 
form — which was true : pelletization and concentrat ion plants were later established 
to process ores and produce iron pellets for export. However, numerous plans and 
maps of a steel manufactur ing centre on Quebec's North Shore inflamed the dreams 
of industrial growth to suggest that something beyond pellet making would eventuate 
too. Power stations were to harness energy for steel mills. Satellite industries would 
quickly be attracted producing thousands more jobs : inapt comparisons with Balt i-
more's steel growth were made hère. New steels, including ferro-chromium for direct 
smelt ing to stainless steel, would be developed because of the known présence for 
chromi te ores in the région. Silica deposits sparked ideas of a ferro-si l icon industry. 
The list was long and impressive: cernent and gypsum, lumber, chemicals, and 
plastics. 
CONCLUSION 
As suggested by the pattern of ownership and contro l of resources in 1950, and 
indeed in the 1980's as well , the construct ion of town sites, railways, mills and mines 
was designated to facil i tate export based industry (Financial Post, 1949). The net to 
mesh the added value within the région, and indeed in Québec, was insufficient to 
land the whole growth and industrial development f ish. Indeed « growth pôle» théories 
and «spread effect» stratégies, such as prevailed at the t ime, were grossly inadéquate 
to base development upon, or indeed to explain the lack of indigenous industrialization 
at risk in this new empire of the St. Lawrence. After ail, the steel companies who 
became engaged in mining were not concerned with, and had never been interested 
in, expanding their manufactur ing and processing opérations to Quebec's North 
Shore. Their main interest, as espoused in United States foreign policy, was to obtain 
new reserves of iron ore to satisfy the hunger of their steel mills. In such a cl imate was 
the face of dependency born in the Québec-Labrador iron mining région. Indeed 
plans for convert ing the Land-God-Gave-to-Cain into an industrial Ruhr must be seen 
as the préparation of the parishioners for a minor festival rather than for an industrial 
mil lenium (Archer, 1983; Bouffard, 1983). 
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NOTE 
1
 The Québec-Labrador région was exposed to a massive restructur ing and closures dur ing 
the late 1970's and early 1980's. The min ing region's populat ion is est imated to hâve dropped 
f rom nearly 70 000 to approx imate ly 30000. The era before 1954-1955 was one in wh ich the 
potential for the région seemed great : there was a degree of euphor ia as the « Fourth Empire of 
the St. Lawrence» was opened up to « development». This paper seeks to expose the weak basis 
for extended growth and the « myth of development» which draws purely upon a single industry 
staple economy. The référence to the Fourth Empire of the St. Lawrence hère is a metaphor of 
the décl ine of the Iron Min ing Région as a whole in the early 1980's. The « Fourth Empire» noted 
hère is thus a metaphorical extension of the «Thi rd Empire» referred to by R.T. Naylor (1972) in 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence in G. Teeple, éd., (1972). 
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